Theory Choice, Non-epistemic Values, and Machine Learning by Dotan, Ravit
1 
 
 
Theory Choice, Non-epistemic Values, and Machine Learning 
 
Ravit Dotan, UC Berkeley 
Forthcoming in Synthese 
 
Abstract:  
I use a theorem from machine learning, called the “No Free Lunch” theorem (NFL) to support 
the claim that non-epistemic values are essential to theory choice. I argue that NFL entails that 
predictive accuracy is insufficient to favor a given theory over others, and that NFL challenges 
our ability to give a purely epistemic justification for using other traditional epistemic virtues in 
theory choice. In addition, I argue that the natural way to overcome NFL’s challenge is to use 
non-epistemic values. If my argument holds, non-epistemic values are entangled in theory choice 
regardless of human limitations and regardless of the subject matter. Thereby, my argument 
overcomes objections to the main lines of argument revealing the role of values in theory choice. 
At the end of the paper, I argue that, contrary to common conception, the epistemic challenge 
arising from NFL is distinct from Hume’s problem of induction and other forms of 
underdetermination 
 
 
What is the role of values in empirical reasoning? It was never controversial that values 
shape the goals of scientific and other empirical inquiries, as well as the choice of the projects 
that are pursued. It was also never controversial that people are in fact prone to be influenced by 
their values in all areas of life, including in their empirical reasoning. The more interesting 
question is whether values have an inherent role in assessing hypotheses. For the last few 
decades, the consensus has been that a completely value-free assessment of hypotheses is 
impossible (McMullin, 1982). Generally, the reason is that available data is never enough to 
uniquely determine which hypothesis is true (due to epistemic puzzles such as 
underdetermination and induction). Therefore, we need to use other considerations when 
comparing hypotheses. The traditional considerations are theoretical virtues, such as simplicity, 
fruitfulness, or applicability to human needs. These theoretical virtues are carriers of values: we 
call simplicity a “virtue” because we value simplicity. 
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But which kinds of values are inherent to assessment of hypotheses? Often, a distinction is 
drawn between two kinds of virtues: epistemic and non-epistemic. Typically, epistemic virtues 
are theoretical characteristics that are valued because they promote epistemic goals, such as the 
attainment of truth, knowledge, understanding, or explanation (for this reason, the epistemic 
virtues are sometimes just called “epistemic values”). For example, if simpler theories are more 
likely to satisfy our epistemic goals, then simplicity is epistemically valuable and is an epistemic 
virtue. Other traditional epistemic virtues include internal consistency, consistency with other 
theories, empirical adequacy, and explanatory power. Non-epistemic virtues are theoretical 
characteristics that are valued because they promote non-epistemic goals, such as creating a more 
just society or making money.  
The aim of this paper is to support the view that non-epistemic values are essential to 
assessment of hypotheses. Other arguments have been criticized for depending on particularities 
that are special to political and practical circumstances. My argument focuses on accuracy and 
draws from a theorem from machine learning, called the “No Free Lunch Theorem”. While there 
are surely differences between human reasoners and algorithms, drawing from a mathematical 
theorem avoids some of the difficulties faced by other arguments because it is independent of 
human contingencies and contextual particularities. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. I start by overviewing the main existing lines of 
argument in section 1. Then, in section 2, I motivate the focus on accuracy and explain which 
aspect of accuracy I am targeting. In section 3, I give a brief and informal overview of the basics 
of the No Free Lunch theorem (you can find a formal statement of the theorem in the appendix). 
I explain why NFL supports the claim that non-epistemic values are essential to theory choice in 
sections 4, 6, and 7. In brief, I argue that (i) NFL entails that predictive accuracy is insufficient to 
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discriminate between hypotheses on its own, (ii) NFL challenges our ability to epistemically 
justify the usage of other traditional epistemic virtues in theory choice, and (iii) a natural way to 
overcome NFL’s challenges is to use non-epistemic values in theory choice. In section 5 I 
respond to an objection. In the last section, section 8, I explain why the epistemic challenge that 
NFL poses is different from Hume’s problem of induction, Goodman’s problem of induction, 
and other forms of underdetermination. 
 
1. Three existing lines of argument 
One line of argument for the claim that non-epistemic values are essential to assessment of 
hypotheses is based on an analysis of the history of science. Kuhn (1962) argues that scientific 
paradigms drastically differ in standards, language, values, modes of engaging with the world, 
institutions, etc. It’s not the case that a scientific paradigm is replaced when another scientific 
paradigm is shown to satisfy epistemic goals better because paradigms differ in their epistemic 
goals. You can only judge that the new paradigm is better than the old one after you have already 
switched to the new epistemic goals, the new ways of thinking, the new language, the new mode 
of engagement with the world, and so on. These kinds of changes are partially driven by non-
epistemic factors. In this respect, scientific revolutions are similar to political revolutions and 
religious conversions. One line of criticism against this argument is due to Kuhn’s reliance on 
history. Some (e.g. Toulmin, 1970; Lauden, 1990; Bird, 2013) argue that Kuhn’s historical 
account of science is incorrect. Others (e.g. Boghossian, 2006) argue that, even if Kuhn’s 
historical account is right, it is not enough to support his conclusion. The problem is that Kuhn’s 
conclusion is universal, about all paradigm shifts, but his evidence is empirical and contingent. 
Other lines of criticism focus on conceptual, metaphysical, and linguistic issues. For example, 
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some argue that Kuhn’s view entails a metaphysical and/or linguistic relativism which is 
untenable (e.g. Davidson, 1973).  
The second line of argument is based on inductive risk. Rudner (1953), Douglas (2009), 
Steel (2013), and others argue that decisions on how much evidence is sufficient to confirm or 
refute hypotheses require non-epistemic values. The basic claim is that there is no strict 
epistemic standard for how much evidence is enough to accept a theory, and the decision 
depends on the risks involved. If there are dire consequences for wrongfully accepting or 
rejecting the hypothesis, we will require more evidence before deciding. Whether the 
consequences are dire depends on what we care about and what is at stake, and therefore 
decisions to accept hypotheses are value-laden. Opponents of this argument put pressure on what 
“acceptance” means in a scientific context. Broadly, the objection is that while inductive risk is 
relevant in practical contexts, it is irrelevant when the practical consequences are far removed 
(e.g. Lacey 1999, 2017; Levi 1962). 
The third line of argument blurs the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic 
virtues. Longino (1990, 1996, 2002, 2014), Okruhlik (1994), and others argue that traditional 
epistemic values are sometimes just manifestations of non-epistemic values. Focusing on 
examples from social science and biology, authors promoting this line of argument argue that 
traditional epistemic values can be politically loaded. Think about consistency with other 
theories, for example. A theory may be biased, but still consistent with other theories because the 
other theories share the same bias. For example, for a long time it was thought that the egg is 
passive in the process of fertilization. One thing that was going for this view is that it was 
consistent with sociological theories and views about gender roles. But this consistency was due 
to the fact that both biological and sociological theories were influenced by social views on the 
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passivity of women (The Biology and Gender Study Group, 1988). One may wonder how well 
blurring the line between epistemic and non-epistemic virtues generalizes. The objection is that 
traditional epistemic values can be neutral in contexts that are less politically loaded than social 
science and biology, such as quantum mechanics or astronomy. 
In sum, these three lines of argument emphasize certain historical, practical, or political 
contexts. Therefore, they are vulnerable to two objections. First, if non-epistemic values happen 
to influence theory choice only in specific cases, perhaps this only shows that people are 
sometimes imperfect; it doesn’t seem to show that non-epistemic values are essential to 
reasoning itself. Second, if the specific cases involve subject matters with obvious practical or 
political implications, then one might object that non-epistemic values are irrelevant for subject 
matters that are theoretical and politically neutral. Instead of thinking of ways in which 
proponents of these arguments can respond, in this paper I support the claim that non-epistemic 
values are essential to assessments of hypotheses by constructing a new argument. I start by 
focusing on accuracy. 
 
2. Focus on accuracy and average expected error 
Accuracy is one of the most influential theoretical virtues today, and arguably even the 
most influential. In particular, accuracy is highly regarded in feminist epistemology and 
philosophy of science. Longino (1996), Rolin (2017), and others highlight its usage and 
importance for feminist as well as traditional scientists. In formal epistemology, members of the 
“accuracy first” school, such as Pettigrew (2016), argue for the priority of accuracy over other 
theoretical virtues. Moreover, many of the other virtues seem to inextricably involve accuracy. 
Think about explainability, fruitfulness, and applicability for human needs, for example. Can we 
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say that a theory explains, is fruitful, or helpful for human needs without addressing its accuracy 
at all, e.g. even if all of its predictions are false? This is not plausible, at least prima facie. The 
centrality of accuracy, both in common perception and in its involvement with the other virtues, 
makes it a worthy focal point in discussing theory choice.  
Spelling out what accuracy means is notoriously tricky. I will use average expected error 
as an approximation of “more likely to be accurate”. As I will argue later, average expected error 
is flexible in that it can capture a wide range of accuracy measures. The result is a broad 
interpretation of accuracy.  
What is average expected error? The error of a hypothesis is the distance between its 
predictions and the results of observations. To illustrate, suppose I have a hypothesis that my 
friend Ankita has the flu. If she really does have the flu, we might want to say that I am 
maximally correct. For the sake of the illustration, say that this means that my error is 0. I.e.: 
𝑒(”Ankita has the flu”,  𝐴𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑢) = 0. 
However, until Ankita sees a doctor I won’t know whether she really has the flu so this 
error wouldn’t be helpful in assessing my hypothesis in advance. It would be more helpful to 
calculate the expected error of my hypothesis. Here’s one way to go. If Ankita is has the flu, my 
error is 0 as discussed. If Ankita doesn’t have the flu, my hypothesis is false. We can say that I 
am maximally mistaken and my error is 1. I.e.: 
𝑒(”Ankita has the flu”,  𝐴𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠𝑛′𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑢) = 1. 
We get the expected error by averaging over my errors on what we take to be the possible 
outcomes. For example: 
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𝐸𝐸(”Ankita has the flu”)
=
𝑒(”Ankita has the flu”,  𝐴𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑎 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑢) + 𝑒(”Ankita has the flu”,  𝐴𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑛′𝑡 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑢)
2
=
0 + 1
2
= 1/2 
Average expected error allows us to measure accuracy with respect to multiple 
predictions. Suppose my policy is to always predict my friends have the flu when they ask me. 
My average expected error would be the average of the expected errors: 
∑ 𝐸𝐸(”friend i has the flu”)𝑖
number of friends
 
Average expected error is a good approximation of “more likely to be accurate”.  
Intuitively, if some hypothesis h1 has a lower average expected error than some other hypothesis 
h2, we would say that h1 is more likely to be accurate than h2. This interpretation of accuracy is 
very broad. In the flu example, there were only two kinds of errors, 0 or 1, and we used the 
absolute difference to compare between the prediction and the true value. However, for the 
purposes of NFL, we can use any accuracy measure that is a function of predicted value and the 
real value alone.  
The No Free Lunch theorem (NFL) compares between algorithms based on average 
expected error. In the next section, I present the theorem using simple cases and drop simplifying 
assumptions as I go. For a more formal statement of the theorem, see the appendix.  
 
3. The No Free Lunch theorem – the basics 
Machine learning algorithms look for patterns in data and use them to make predictions. 
Unlike hand-coded algorithms, machine learning algorithms use data to extract the values of 
crucial parameters themselves. Two of the most well-known machine learning tasks are 
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regression and classification (both are kinds of what is called “supervised learning”). Regression 
algorithms predict numerical values given some input. For example, regression algorithms can 
predict the price at which a house will sell, based on information about previous sales. 
Classification algorithms specify to which of K categories an input belongs. For example, 
classification algorithms can be used to recognize different people in photos. In both cases, and 
in all machine learning algorithms, some of the key parameters the algorithm requires to perform 
its task are hand-coded in advance, but some are learned by the algorithms themselves from past 
data. 1 
A family of impossibility results by the name of “No Free Lunch” theorems reveals 
limitations on what algorithms can do. In particular, Wolpert’s (1996) No Free Lunch Theorem 
roughly says that no learning algorithm universally performs better than any other.2 To 
informally explain what that means, imagine the following thought experiment: run some 
algorithm on some dataset. For example, run a certain regression algorithm on some housing 
prices dataset. Choose some error measure and use it to assess the algorithm’s predictions on this 
dataset, on a second dataset, and on all possible datasets. What NFL says is that no matter which 
error measure you chose, the average expected error on all possible datasets is the same for all 
regression algorithms. This includes the most sophisticated learning algorithms, algorithms that 
make random guesses, and all other algorithmic ways to make predictions based on information. 
For a more concrete illustration, suppose you want to diagnose whether a patient has a 
certain kind of flu based on three symptoms: fever, cough, and runny nose. 3 You construct an 
algorithm that takes a binary sequence of three digits as input: the first digit signifies whether the 
 
1 For a more technical, yet accessible, introduction to machine learning algorithms see Russell & Norvig (2010). 
2 To be more precise, Wolpert’s (1996) theorem applies to supervised learning algorithms.  
3 This thought experiment is loosely based on the adversary argument from Culberson (1998) and the OR/XOR 
example from Wilson & Martinez (1997). 
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patient has a fever, the second digit signifies whether they have a cough, and the third digit 
signifies whether they have a runny nose. “1” means that the patient has the symptom, and “0” 
means that they don’t. For example, “011” means that the patient doesn’t have a fever, does have 
a cough, and does have a runny nose. The algorithm’s output is whether the patient has the flu. 
“1” means that they have it, “0” means that they don’t. The task of the algorithm is classification, 
as the goal is to sort patients into two categories – having the flu and not having it. 
The story about the flu doesn’t matter much for the algorithm. What matters is that the 
algorithm gets a three-digit binary sequence, and outputs either 1 or 0. The dataset could 
represent anything – symptoms and disease diagnosis, studying habits and whether a student will 
pass a test, financial profile and whether a client will pay back a loan, and so on. In the general 
case, we can imagine an interaction with a generator. We produce three-digit binary sequences, 
e.g. 011, and send them to the generator. For every new sequence, the generator sends back 
either 0 or 1. We can presuppose that for every sequence that was already evaluated, the 
generator will send back the same digit that was sent in the past. To illustrate:  
 
We can also presuppose that the generator works in accordance with a function, and our 
algorithm’s job is to guess what that function is. Further, we can presuppose that the generator 
doesn’t change. That is, the function won’t change. In some cases, we may have some 
information about which function the generator is using. However, in the general case, we make 
no further assumptions about the generator and the patterns it produces. That is the case the NFL 
targets – making no assumptions about the problem we are trying to solve, except that the 
generator stays the same.   
Generator 
011 
1 
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The generator plays the role that nature plays when we think about experimentation in 
science. We interact with it, and it produces some patterns. In this rendering, the stipulation that 
the generator always uses the same function means assuming that the regularities in nature, or the 
laws of nature, are not changing. The stipulation that we make no assumptions about how the 
generator works beyond consistency with its past (in the sense that if 001 outputted 1 in the past, 
it will do so every time it is inputted) means that we make no assumptions about the content of 
the regularities we are trying to discover beyond consistency with their past. 
Before we sit down to write our algorithm, we interact with the generator. We send some 
inputs to it and write down the responses we get. The resulting repository of past responses is 
called a training set. Suppose the training set is:  
Training Set: 000→0, 011→1, 100→1   
Now, suppose you constructed two different algorithms, A and B, to diagnose the flu. You 
run both algorithms on the training set and they produce two different hypotheses, FIRST and 
SECOND:  
 
Algorithm A → FIRST – the output is identical to the first digit of the input. 
Algorithm B → SECOND – the output is identical to the second digit of the input. 
For example, FIRST predicts that the output for 011 is 0, and SECOND predicts that the output 
for it is 1. In flu diagnostics’ terminology, FIRST says that having a fever is a necessary and 
Training 
Set 
000→0 
011→1 
100→1  
Algorithm 
A 
Algorithm 
B 
FIRST 
SECOND 
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sufficient condition for having this type of flu, and SECOND says that having a cough is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for having it.  
How do we determine which algorithm is better? NFL focuses on minimizing average 
expected error. More specifically, NFL focuses on average expected error which gives all 
input/output pairs the same weight. This move is meant to reflect the fact that we make no 
assumptions about the generator, i.e. that we make no assumptions about the regularities we are 
trying to discover.  
In our example, comparing the hypotheses’ errors on inputs that appear in the training set is 
not helpful because both hypotheses do equally well on it: they both get 2/3 of the training set 
right: FIRST is right about 000 and 100 and wrong about 011. SECOND is right about 000 and 
011 and wrong about 100. But, in any case, the error on the training set is not reliable. The 
problem is that the hypotheses were constructed to fit that training set in particular. They fit not 
only the data but also any noise that might be influencing the sample we happen to have. In the 
example above we assumed that there is no noise, but we can’t assume so in the general case. In 
general, high accuracy on the training set might indicate that the hypothesis is, in a sense, too ad 
hoc, and will not generalize well. Thus, NFL focuses on hypotheses’ accuracy on inputs that are 
not included in the training set (see Wolpert, 1996, especially pp. 1345-1348, for further 
discussion). 
The error on inputs that aren’t in the training set is called the off-training-set error (OTS): 
Off-Training-Set error (OTS): the average expected error on inputs that are not included 
in the training set.  
For example, this is how to calculate A’s off-training-set error: 
1. Choose one possible input that is not in the training set.  
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For example, let’s choose 010.  
2. Choose an error measure 
NFL holds no matter which error measure we choose , so it doesn’t matter which one we 
use for the purpose of illustrating NFL. 
Let’s decide that the error is the difference between the prediction and the real output. For 
example, if the algorithm guesses 0 and the real output is 1, the error is |0-1|=1. 
3. Calculate the algorithm’s expected error on this input.  
For example, let’s calculate A’s expected error on 010. There are two possible outputs, 0 
and 1, and A’s guess is 0. If the output is really 0, A’s error is 0. However, if the output 
will be 1, A’s error is 1. Overall, A’s expected error on this input is the average of the 
potential errors. Since we’re not making any assumptions about the problem we are 
trying to solve, we’re not going to use any weights: 
𝑒𝑒(𝐴, 011? ) =
∑ 𝑒(𝐴, 𝑦)𝑦∈𝑌
|𝑌|
=
𝑒(𝐴, 0) + 𝑒(𝐴, 1)
2
=
0 + 1
2
= 1/2 
Where: Y is the set of all possible outputs, i.e. 0 and 1; |Y| is the number of possible 
outputs, i.e. 2. 
4. Calculate the algorithm’s expected error for all possible inputs not in the training set. 
In this case, there are 5 possible inputs not in the training set: 010, 001, 101, 110, 111. 
By the same reasoning in the previous step, A’s expected error on all possible inputs is 
the same: 1/2. 
5. The Off-Training-Set error is the average of the expected errors of all possible inputs not in 
the training set.  
For example, A’s OTSE is 1/2: 
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𝑂𝑇𝑆𝐸(𝐴) =
∑ 𝑒𝑒(𝐴, 𝑥)𝑥∈𝑋
|𝑋|
=
𝑒𝑒(𝐴, 010? ) + ⋯ + 𝑒𝑒(𝐴, 111? )
5
=
5 ∙ 1/2
5
= 1/2 
Where: X is the set of all possible inputs not in the training set.   
  
The same reasoning applies to all algorithms. For example, B’s OTS error is also 1/2. To 
see this, consider the same possible input as before, 010. B’s prediction is that the output for it 
will be 1. If the true output is 1, B is correct and its error on this input is 0. However, if the actual 
output is 0, B is wrong and its error is 1. Therefore, B’s expected error on this input is 
(1+0)/2=0.5. The same is true for all possible inputs, and so B’s OTS error is also 0.5.  
The result of the above discussion is that if we make no assumptions about the generator 
in the example except for consistency with the past, then all algorithms have the same average 
expected error in trying to discover the regularities it produces.  
Time to drop some simplifying assumptions. First, in the example, the error of a 
hypothesis on a given input was the difference between the prediction and the actual output. 
However, we could use any error measure. Second, in the example, the inputs and outputs were 
binary, there was no noise, and the function was deterministic. NFL doesn’t require making these 
assumptions. There are no restrictions on the kinds of inputs and outputs, the function may be 
non-deterministic, and the training set may include noise. Third, the algorithms I compared, A 
and B, perform equally well on the training set. However, NFL applies regardless of 
performance on the training set. Even algorithms that perform poorly on the training set have the 
same average expected error as all others. The general result is that, if we make no assumptions 
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about the generator, all algorithms have the same average expected error. That is the point of 
NFL. 4 
For a formal derivation of NFL, see Wolpert (1996). However, we can intuitively see why 
all algorithms have the same average expected error. When calculating the expected error for 
each input in step 3, we count all possible outputs as equally likely. The reason is that we make 
no assumptions about how the generator operates except for consistency with the past. I.e., we 
make no assumptions about the outputs that are likely to be produced in the problem we are 
trying to solve. Because we make no assumptions about possible outputs, for the purposes of 
OTS error it doesn’t matter which predictions the algorithm makes. The contribution to the 
average expected error will always be the same – getting it right in one case and getting it wrong 
in all others.  
Notice that NFL doesn’t require that we assume that the world is structureless. Rather, it 
presupposes the existence of some structure – that the same input will result in the same output. 
In this sense, that NFL is less skeptical than Hume’s problem of induction, which questions the 
justification of assuming that the future is like the past. I’ll further address similarities and 
differences between NFL, problems of induction, and underdetermination in section 8. Before, I 
spell out the relevance of NFL to theory choice in sections 4 and 6, and 7, and discuss an 
objection in section 5.  
 
 
4 Since NFL allows to use any error measure that is only a function of the relevant values and prominent distance 
measures are also functions of the same values, we can manipulate NFL’s results to bear on popular error 
measures. For example, suppose we use square Euclidian distance as our error measure for NFL: |𝑌𝐹(x) − 𝑌𝐻(x)|
2, 
where 𝑌𝐻(x) is the algorithm’s prediction for input x and 𝑌𝐹(x) is the true output. Then, according to NFL, all 
algorithms have the same average expected error: ∑ |𝑌𝐹(x) − 𝑌𝐻(x)|
2
𝑥∈X /|𝑋| (where X is the set of all relevant 
inputs). However, since |X| is just the number of items in X, the quantitiy ∑ |𝑌𝐹(x) − 𝑌𝐻(x)|
2
𝑥∈X  is also the same 
for all algorithms. But ∑ |𝑌𝐹(x) − 𝑌𝐻(x)|
2
𝑥∈X  is the Brier inaccuracy measure. Therefore, we get that the 
predictions of all algorithms are equally inaccuate relative to the Brier inaccuracy measure. 
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4. NFL and theory choice 
NFL is formulated as a theorem about algorithms. However, it seems to be about 
something else. Algorithms can be compared in many ways: using their efficiency, the year in 
which they were created, the number of times the letter “A” appears in them, and so on. NFL 
doesn’t evaluate algorithms based on these or other characteristics of algorithms. Rather, it 
compares the products of the algorithms – the sets of predictions, classifications, hypotheses, etc. 
that they produce. For example, in the case above the comparison is between the two hypotheses 
produced by algorithms A and B: FIRST and SECOND. Therefore, loosely speaking, the point 
of NFL is that all hypotheses have the same average expected error. I say I use the word 
“hypotheses” loosely because I don’t mean to be committing to any particular view on what 
hypotheses are, nor do I mean to say that NFL is about comparisons of hypotheses rather than 
comparisons of theories, sets of predictions, classifications, and so on. What I do mean to do is to 
draw attention to the fact that NFL pertains to the question of theory choice: Which hypothesis 
(or theory, or a set of predictions, etc.) is better? It is perhaps for this reason that Wolpert himself 
argues that NFL has wide-ranging implications for science. In the context of science, he thinks of 
different algorithms as analogous to different scientists who are “producing accurate theories 
from data” (2012, p. 5).  
If we think of NFL in this way, as comparing between hypotheses or sets of predictions, it 
has implications for theory choice. NFL entails that if we don’t make any assumptions about the 
regularities we are trying to discover except for consistency with the past, all hypotheses have 
the same average expected error. If average excepted error is a measure of how likely a 
hypothesis is to be accurate, then all hypotheses are equally likely to be accurate. Therefore, 
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predictive accuracy is not a standard that can be used to discriminate between hypotheses, if we 
are making no assumptions about the problem we are trying to solve.5  
What could we use to supplement predictive accuracy? We could use accuracy on the data 
we already have, i.e. the training data. However, as discussed above, a good fit with the training 
data may be misleading because it may be a result of a good fit with the noise. 
Another option is to use other traditional epistemic virtues, e.g. simplicity, coherence with 
other theories, explainability, or understanding. NFL poses a challenge to this approach. What 
makes these virtues valuable? Why use them for theory choice? Some justify the usage of these 
virtues by arguing that they help us discover the truth. For example, Swinburne argues that 
simple hypotheses are more likely to produce true predictions, all else being equal: 
I seek…to show that—other things being equal—the simplest hypothesis proposed as an 
explanation of phenomena is more likely to be the true one than is any other available 
hypothesis, that its predictions are more likely to be true than those of any other available 
hypothesis, and that it is an ultimate a priori epistemic principle that simplicity is evidence 
for truth (Swinburne 1997, p. 1). 
 
Similarly, Lipton (2004) argues that the epistemic value of explanation is that “the 
explanation that would, if true, provide the deepest understanding is the explanation that is 
likeliest to be true” (p. 61). For this reason, he thinks that “the exciting promise of Inference to 
the Best explanation” is “showing how explanatory considerations are our guide to truth” (p. 62). 
Lipton argues that this view of the inference to the best explanation helps make sense of the fact 
that scientists use aesthetic considerations such as theoretical elegance, simplicity, and 
unification in making scientific inferences. It makes sense that they use them because these 
considerations are marks of good explanations, which are guiding us to truth (p. 66).  
 
5 See Dotan (forthcoming) for more discussion of the implication of the No Free Lunch theorem on using accuracy 
in theory choice.  
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  Swinburne and Lipton use the language of “more likely to be true”. However, if true 
predictions are accurate predictions and more likely to be true is more likely to be accurate, NFL 
contradicts their arguments. NFL shows that all hypotheses, no matter their properties, are 
equally likely to be accurate if we are unwilling to make any assumptions about the regularity 
about which we are hypothesizing. In particular, simple and explanatory hypotheses are as likely 
to be accurate as complex and non-explanatory hypotheses.  
The challenge that NFL poses to theory choice is that, if we aren’t making further 
assumptions about the problems we are trying to solve, accuracy considerations alone are 
insufficient for theory choice. If we want to use epistemic virtues other than accuracy, we need to 
justify them without relying on accuracy. One option is to explain what “more likely to be true” 
means not in terms of accuracy. However, disconnecting between truth and accuracy is difficult.  
Prima facie, a hypothesis that produces inaccurate predictions is false. Another option is to 
justify the usage of epistemic virtues using their aesthetic features. Perhaps having a deep 
explanation or an elegant theory are valuable on their own, regardless of truth. As Lipton points 
out, scientists do use these aesthetic features for theory choice in practice. However, if we use 
theoretical virtues due to their aesthetic value, then theory choice relies on non-epistemic 
considerations. Thus, NFL’s challenge to theory choice is giving an epistemic justification to 
appealing to theoretical virtues without appealing to accuracy, or at least predictive accuracy. 
 I argue later in the paper that NFL poses a challenge to theory choice even if we are 
happy to make assumptions about the regularity we are trying to discover. The reason is that 
NFL applies to whatever methods we use to decide which assumptions to make. I discuss this 
more general case in sections 6 and 7. However, before that, I consider an objection to NFL.  
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5. Objection: What about validation error? 
 NFL focuses on measuring errors on inputs that do not appear in the training set. As 
discussed, the reason is that the algorithm finds a function that fits the entire training set, 
including any potential noise. When the training set error is too low, it might indicate that the 
hypothesis will not generalize well, i.e. won’t produce good predictions for new data. A standard 
solution in machine learning is to evaluate hypotheses not on their training set error, but rather 
on their validation error.  
The general idea is to split the data we have into two and only use a part of it to train the 
algorithm. The rest, which is called a “validation set” is used to evaluate the algorithm. For 
example, suppose we start with all the data we had before, plus one additional data point: 
010→1. We divide the data set into two: a training set which is identical to the one we had 
before, and a validation set consisting of the new data point. 
Entire data set: 000→0, 011→1, 100→1, 010→1 
Training Set: 000→0, 011→1, 100→1 (same as before) 
Validation Set: 010→1  
When we train our algorithms, A and B, on this training set, they will come up with the same 
hypotheses, FIRST and SECOND. However, now we can compare them using the validation 
set, the data we haven’t used to train A and B. The error on the new data, the validation set, is 
called “validation error”. We calculate the validation error by comparing the prediction of the 
hypothesis and the information in the validation set. We can see that FIRST’s validation error 
is 1 since it predicts 010→0, but the validation set is 010→1. SECOND’s validation error is 0 
since it predicts 010→1. Schematically: 
 
 Training 
Set 
000→0 
011→1 
100→1 
Validation 
Set 
010→1 
Algorithm 
A 
Algorithm 
B 
FIRST 
SECOND 
Validation 
FIRST’s 
validation 
error=1 
All 
data 
000→0 
011→1 
100→1 
010→1 
SECOND’s 
validation 
error=0 
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Should we choose between our hypotheses based on minimizing validation error? The 
problem is that there are many other ways to do validation. To give just a few examples, we 
could single out a different data point as the validation set. Alternatively, we could use multiple 
data points as a validation set, instead of just one like in the example above. Moreover, we 
could run the validation process multiple times, each time splitting the data differently, and 
average over the results for each hypothesis. Arlot and Celisse (2010) survey various 
validation algorithms in use today, focusing on their strengths and weaknesses. They argue that 
different validation algorithms work well in different circumstances. Given that different 
algorithms are suited to different situations, it is at least not typical that various validation 
algorithms will give the same recommendation.  
We need to choose between validation algorithms somehow. This brings us back to the 
same problem with which we started – how should we choose between algorithms/the 
hypotheses they produce? For the same reasons as before, comparing their OTS error is a good 
option. Validation algorithms are still algorithms giving predictions based on a training set, just 
like A and B. The only difference is that they use the training set in a more sophisticated way. 
However, just like all other algorithms, they are susceptible to overfitting. Illustrating this point, 
using a series of experiments, Schaffer (1993a; 1993b) has shown that using validation 
techniques sometimes leads to worse performance on new data than not using validation at all. 
However, if we are comparing between validation algorithms based on their OTS error, we are 
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back in NFL territory. All algorithms, including validation algorithms, have the same average 
expected error.  
This result may be surprising at first glance. Certain machine learning algorithms are 
successful in practice, much more than others. In particular, validation techniques are widely 
used, usually with great success. However, these observations do not conflict with NFL. NFL 
only determines that all algorithms perform equally well on average. Some algorithms can still 
be better than others on individual problems. Thus, many take the moral from NFL to be that we 
need to know more about the problems we encounter in reality. Using this information, we could 
explore which algorithms work well for which types of problems (e.g. Gomez and Rojas 2016; 
Fernadez-Delgado et al., 2014), or which assumptions we can safely make about our problems 
(e.g. Igel & Toussaint, 2004; Lattimore and Hutter, 2011). However, as I discuss in the next 
section, the methods we use to discover the assumptions are also subject to NFL. 
 
6. Implications for theory choice with assumptions 
The discussion so far made no assumptions about the generator, i.e. no assumptions on 
the problem we are trying to solve. NFL uses average expected error with equal weights because 
the point is that all hypotheses have the same performance if we average over all possible 
problems. However, some algorithms do better than others on a given set of problems. You 
might want to say that we could compare between algorithms or hypotheses using epistemic 
considerations alone, if we restrict our attention to their performance on the kinds of problems 
that we encounter in the actual world, which is a subset of all possible problems. The way 
forward would then be finding the right assumptions to make to restrict our attention to the right 
kinds of problems.  
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The question is how to decide which assumptions to make, i.e. which problems to 
prioritize. We could construct another algorithm to analyze data to come up with more basic 
hypotheses on what our world is like. However, NFL would apply to this algorithm as well, and 
therefore this strategy just pushes the bump under the rug.  
Therefore, while we must choose a subset of all possible problems to escape NFL, we 
cannot choose our assumptions based on accuracy considerations alone. We could supplement 
accuracy with other traditional epistemic virtues, such as simplicity or explainability. However, 
as discussed above, NFL challenges the ability to provide a pure epistemic justification for using 
these virtues. It is not the case that the assumptions that are simplest or most explanatory will 
guide us to truth in the sense of producing more accurate predictions.  
 
7. Putting things together 
We learn from NFL that the standard of accuracy is insufficient to discriminate between 
hypotheses. If we make no assumptions about the regularities we are trying to discover, all 
hypotheses are equally likely to be accurate. If we want to make assumptions, accuracy is not 
enough to choose assumptions. NFL invites us to explore which considerations we do want to 
use for theory choice, and why. Whichever consideration we use, e.g. simplicity or explanatory 
power, the justification cannot be based on accuracy alone. NFL applies to all hypotheses, simple 
or complex, explanatory or not. 
 NFL supports the claim that non-epistemic values are necessary for theory choice in three 
ways. First, accuracy, possibly the most influential epistemic virtue, is insufficient to 
discriminate between hypotheses. Second, NFL challenges the ability to provide pure epistemic 
justifications for using other traditional epistemic virtues for theory choice. Third, non-epistemic 
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values are natural candidates to supplement accuracy or other considerations. NFL only applies 
when we compare the accuracy of theories on all possible problems. However, some hypotheses 
are more likely to be accurate than others once we restrict our attention to some problems. Since 
we can’t restrict the set of problems we consider based on accuracy, it makes sense that we 
restrict ourselves to measuring accuracy on the problems we care about. That is a value-based 
decision.  
 The argument from NFL avoids the vulnerabilities of other arguments revealing the role 
of non-epistemic values in theory choice. Unlike Kuhn’s argument, the argument from NFL is 
not based on the contingent history of science and is not committed to relativism. Unlike the 
argument from inductive risk, the argument from NFL isn’t sensitive to contexts. The point is 
that all hypotheses have the same average expected error, no matter whether accuracy 
measurements are used for practical or theoretical purposes. Unlike arguments blurring the 
distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic virtues, the argument from NFL is not focused 
on politically loaded subject matters. Learning algorithms are an idealization of inductive 
reasoning, and NFL is an impossibility theorem that applies to all applications of inductive 
reasoning. Nothing is specific to any particular field. 
Some think that non-epistemic influences on assessment of theories are inherently bad. 
For example, Lacey argues that the cost of admitting non-epistemic values as an essential 
component of hypothesis assessment is losing “all prospects of gaining significant knowledge” 
(1999, p. 216), and exposing ourselves to the dangers of wishful thinking or to the “back and 
forth play of biases, with only power to settle the matter”. Of course, even if it is bad for non-
epistemic values to influence science, it doesn’t mean that they don’t. In my view, to use Steel 
and Elliott’s (2017) metaphor, values in science are like knives in cooking. They can be 
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dangerous if used irresponsibly, but we are very limited if we don’t use them at all. Various 
views have been developed to explain how we can handle non-epistemic values responsibly. For 
example, Longino (1990, 2002), Rolin (2017), and others argue for versions of a “value-
management” ideal of science. According to them, objectivity does not stem from the judgments 
of individuals, but rather from community practices. To be objective, scientific communities 
must be open and responsive to the right kind of critical discourse. NFL gives us another reason 
to develop conceptions of objectivity and of science which, like this one, manage the influence 
of non-epistemic values.  
 
8. Comparing NFL with problems of induction and underdetermination 
In closing, I’d like to discuss the uniqueness of NFL’s epistemic challenge. You might 
wonder whether NFL reduces to the problem of induction or underdetermination. However, first, 
even if NFL is reducible to a familiar epistemic puzzle, it’s still helpful in noticing that theory 
choice involves non-epistemic values while overcoming challenges other arguments face. 
Second, as I argue next, NFL is different from Hume’s problem of induction and from other 
versions of underdetermination.  
  
8.1 NFL and Hume’s problem of induction 
NFL is not discussed much from a philosophical perspective. When it is, it is often 
assumed to be a manifestation of Hume’s problem of induction (e.g. Domingos, 2012; Giraud-
Carrier & Provost, 2005; Korb, 2004; Schaffer, 1994; Wolpert, 1996, 2012). Yet the two issues 
are distinct.  
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Hume’s problem of induction is about how to justify inductive inferences. For example, 
how to justify moving from the following premise to the following conclusion (Henderson, 
2020): 
I. All observed instances of bread (of a particular appearance) have been nourishing. 
II. The next instance of bread (of that appearance) will be nourishing. 
Hume is interested in the justification of moving from premise (I) to conclusion (II). First, no 
deductive argument can be used to do so. The reason is that in deductive arguments the falsity of 
the conclusion is inconsistent with the premises, but the negation of (II) is consistent with (I). 
Second, no non-deductive arguments can be used to move from (I) to (II), because it would rely 
on circular reasoning. Moving from (I) to (II) requires presupposing what is sometimes called the 
“principle of the uniformity of nature”, according to which the unobserved is similar to the 
observed. To justify the principle of the uniformity of nature we would need another non-
deductive argument, which would itself presuppose the principle of the uniformity of nature. 
Therefore, according to Hume, no argument can be given to justify inductive inferences. 
NFL is similar to Hume’s problem of induction in that both point to difficulties in 
moving from past observations to predictions. However, NFL is different from Hume’s problem 
because NFL doesn’t question the principle of the uniformity of nature and doesn’t look for a 
justification for a general form of inference. 
First, NFL presupposes the uniformity of nature. In the terminology of this paper, 
presupposing that nature is uniform is presupposing that the generator, which represents nature, 
stays the same. For example, all patients with the same symptoms have the same diagnosis. If the 
dataset was about the nourishment of bread, the assumption would have been that all instances of 
bread of the same appearance are equally nourishing. The issue that NFL is concerned with is 
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what we can infer from instances of bread of a certain appearance on instances of bread of a 
different appearance. Because of this difference, solutions to Hume’s problem of induction that 
are looking to justify the uniformity of nature are irrelevant to NFL. 
Second, NFL doesn’t question a general form of inference. Some solutions to Hume’s 
problem of induction reject the need to justify induction at all. For example, Strawson (1952) 
argues that inductive inferences are foundational. Asking whether induction is valid is senseless, 
like asking whether the legal system is legal. In his alternative account of induction, inductive 
support simply consists in observing enough positive instances of the inductive claim. In other 
words, inductive standards are baked into the meanings to terms such as “inductively justified”. 
There is no need to give any further support or justification for inductive arguments. However, 
even assuming that solutions like Strawson’s deflate Hume’s problem of induction, they do not 
deflate the argument from NFL. Admitting that inductive reasoning is foundational or built into 
the meaning of terms like “justification” doesn’t point to any epistemic reasons to choose 
between inductive hypotheses, which is the point NFL presses on. NFL is simply not about the 
justification of inductive inferences in general.  
Other approaches to Hume’s problem of induction may be conducive to the NFL 
discussion. What I have in mind here are solutions that account for induction non-epistemically. 
Take Hume’s own solution for example. Hume argues that we accept the principle of uniformity 
of nature not because of any reasoning, but because of some psychological mechanisms. For 
example, when the sight of fire has generally been accompanied by a feeling of heat, our 
instinctual mental mechanisms will lead us to expect heat when we see fire in the future. 
Applying this to NFL, some instinctual mental mechanisms may lead us to have certain 
expectations about the fluwhich we may use in designing our algorithm. NFL supports the claim 
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that these expectations don’t have epistemic value (in the sense that using them won’t lead to 
lower average expected error), but they may still constitute good non-epistemic reasons to 
choose between hypotheses. Hume’s solution is only one example of how we can use non-
epistemic considerations to choose between inductive hypotheses. The right kind of non-
epistemic considerations to use, if there are any, may or may not piggy-back on solutions to 
Hume's problem of induction.  
 
  8.2 NFL and other forms of underdetermination 
The case I focused on in the discussion above was the comparison between FIRST and 
SECOND, two hypotheses that do equally well on existing data. The difficulties in choosing 
between them are difficulties of underdetermination, as the available data is insufficient to 
determine which hypothesis is true. Therefore, you might think that NFL reduces to some form 
of underdetermination, even if not to Hume’s problem of induction. However, I argue that NFL 
is different from familiar cases of underdetermination in that it extends the class of 
underdetermined theories. 
First, you might think, like Lauc (2018), that NFL is a rediscovery of Goodman’s new 
riddle of induction. Goodman’s new riddle of induction is concerned with how artificial 
predicates like “grue” can give rise to underdetermination. The point is that the fact that all 
emeralds observed before time t have been green is insufficient to determine whether emeralds 
observed after t will also be green. The reason is that our observations are consistent with various 
hypotheses that make different predictions, such as “all emeralds are green” and “all emeralds 
observed before time t are green, but the rest are blue”. Another form of underdetermination is 
given by van Fraassen (1980). van Fraassen is concerned with underdetermination between 
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theories that make the same predictions. The point is that theories can make the same predictions 
but still differ, for example by making different untestable empirical assumptions. Such theories 
are underdetermined in principle. 
NFL’s variety of underdetermination extends the class of underdetermined theories. 
Goodman, van Fraassen, and others only consider the set of hypotheses that are equally 
supported by observations. However, NFL also includes hypotheses that do less well on the 
existing data. NFL determines that all algorithms have the same average expected error, and that 
includes algorithms that produce hypotheses that are incompatible with the training set.  
For example, consider algorithm C, which produces the hypothesis Least Common6: 
Algorithm C → Least Common (LC): the output is the digit that is least common in the input.  
For example, 011 corresponds to 0 because the digit 0 appears less than the digit 1 in the input, 
and 000 corresponds to 1. In the flu example, LC says that having at most one of the symptoms 
is a necessary and sufficient condition for having this type of flu. 
  LC gets only 1/3 of the samples in the training set right (recall that our training set 
consists of 000→0, 011→1, 100→1). This is worse than FIRST and SECOND, which get 2/3 of 
the training samples right. Yet, LC has the same off-training-set error as FIRST and SECOND. 
Consider LC’s error on 010. LC predicts that the output will be 1. If the output turns out to be 1 
LC is correct and has 0 error, but if the true output is 0 LC’s error is 1. On average, LC’s error on 
010 (and on any other possible input) is 1/2. The same is true for all possible inputs not in the 
training set and therefore C’s OTS error is 1/2, just like FIRST and SECOND. 
 Should we favor FIRST and SECOND over LC? NFL highlights that accuracy on past 
and future data can come apart. If we care only about accuracy with respect to future data, then 
 
6 Based on the OR/XOR example from Wilson & Martinez (1997). 
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there are no epistemic reasons to favor FIRST and SECOND over LC, as they all satisfy the 
epistemic goal of predictive accuracy equally well. However, if we care about accuracy with 
respect to the data we already have then we do have reasons to favor FIRST and SECOND. The 
question we come back to again is – with respect to what do we want our theories to be accurate? 
The answer to this question depends on non-epistemic values. 
 
9. Conclusion 
NFL supports the claim that non-epistemic values are needed for theory choice in three 
ways. First, NFL shows that accuracy, which is a central epistemic virtue, is insufficient for 
discriminating between hypotheses (while the theorem is strictly speaking about predictive 
accuracy, the discussion about it includes a critique of accuracy on the existing data). Second, 
NFL challenges our ability to give a purely epistemic justification for using other virtues for 
theory choice, as illustrated on simplicity and explanatory power. Third, a natural way to 
overcome NFL’s challenge is to use our values to restrict the set of problems we are trying to 
solve. Unlike other arguments in the vicinity, the argument from NFL is independent of human 
and contextual contingencies. In addition, I have shown that NFL is distinct from Hume’s 
problem of induction and other forms of underdetermination  
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Appendix: The No Free Lunch theorem(s) 
“No Free Lunch” is the name of a family of theorems. Differences between No Free 
Lunch theorems include differences between the kinds of algorithms they consider. For example, 
initially No Free Lunch theorems were proven for optimization algorithms (Wolpert and 
Macready, 1992). Wolpert (1996, 2001, 2012) proves No Free Lunch theorems for supervised 
learning algorithms, and this is what I have focused on in this paper. Schaffer (1994) gives an 
elegant formulation of Wolpert’s main No Free Lunch Theorem for classification learning 
algorithms, based on a preprint of Wolpert (1996). In this appendix, I state Schaffer’s 
formulation to illustrate what NFL theorems say more formally (Schaffer calls it the “Law of 
Conservation of Generalization of Performance”). See Montanez (2017, chapter 2) for a review 
of various No Free Lunch results, and see Schaffer (1994) and Wolpert (1996) for a proof of the 
theorem which I will state here. 
We start with defining cases in a classification problem. Each case in a classification 
problem, 𝐴𝑖, is a vector of attributes. For simplicity, we assume that each component in the 
vector is a finite number. {𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑚} is the set of all possible attribute vectors, where m is finite. 
C is a class probability vector, which defines the relationship between attribute vectors and 
classes. Each component of C, 𝐶i, is the probability that a case with attribute 𝐴𝑖 belongs to class 
1. We assume that data is generated in the same way in training and testing a learner: attribute 
vectors are sampled with replacement according to an arbitrary distribution D and a class is 
assigned to them using C. We also assume that the training set contains n samples. A learning 
situation S is a triple (D, C, n). 
  The Generalization Accuracy of a learner (𝐺𝐴𝐿) is the expected prediction performance 
of a learner on cases with attribute vectors not represented in the training set. For example, the 
generalization accuracy of a random guesser in a two-class problem is 1/2 for every D and C. We 
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use the generalization accuracy of a random guesser as a baseline and define Generalization 
Performance of a learner (GPL) the difference between its generalization accuracy and the 
generalization accuracy of a random guesser: 
𝐺𝑃𝐿 = 𝐺𝐴𝐿 − 𝐺𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑟 
Generalization performance greater than zero means better than chance performance. 𝐺𝑃𝐿(𝑆) is 
the generalization performance of learner L in learning situation S. 
Using the notation above we can write Schaffer’s Law of Conservation of Generalization 
Performance: 
∑ 𝐺𝑃𝐿(𝑆) = 0𝑆      , for every D, n 
In words, this law says that any positive performance by a learner in a certain learning situation 
must be exactly balanced by negative performance in other learning situations.  
If we allow for the possibility of noise, then the law is properly written with an integral 
instead of a summation: 
∫ 𝐺𝑃𝐿(𝑆)𝑑𝑠 = 0𝑆     , for every D,n 
  
In this case, the components of C are taken from the real interval [0,1] and the integral runs over 
the space [0,1]m of class probability vector. Without noise, the components of C are taken from 
{0,1} and the summation runs over 2m possible class probability vectors.  
 From the conservation law, it follows that all learners have the same average 
generalization performance if we average over all possible learning situations (or, as I put it, that 
all algorithms have the same expected error if we make no assumptions about the problem we are 
trying to solve). Here’s why.  
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For any learner: 
∑ 𝐺𝑃𝐿(𝑆)
𝑆
= ∑(𝐺𝐴𝐿(S) − 𝐺𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑟(𝑆))
𝑆
= 0 
Add   ∑ 𝐺𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑟(𝑆)𝑆  to both sides and get: 
   ∑ 𝐺𝐴𝐿(𝑆)𝑆 = ∑ 𝐺𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑟(𝑆)𝑆  
Divide by the number of learning situations and get the formulation that was used in this paper – 
that the average generalization performance of any learner L is equal, and in particular equal to 
that of the random guesser: 
∑ 𝐺𝐴𝐿(𝑆)𝑆
#𝑠
=
∑ 𝐺𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑟(𝑆)𝑆
#𝑆
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